Afghanistan must not become another Vietnam

The Obama administration has three major foreign policy decisions to make by year’s end: whether to send more troops to Afghanistan, how to persuade Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons program, and how much pressure to exert on Israel and the Arab countries to end their conflict over Palestine. Afghanistan clearly tops that list.

The growing debate between those who favor a strengthened counterinsurgency effort, centered on recommendations by Gen. Stanley McChrystal, U.S. commander in Afghanistan, and those who prefer a counterterrorism strategy against al-Qaida in Pakistan is consuming the attention of the president and his National Security Council. U.S. forces in Afghanistan currently number about 68,000, and Gen. McChrystal is asking for up to 40,000 more.

Obama’s dilemma on additional troops for Afghanistan resembles President Lyndon Johnson’s quandary on Vietnam in 1965. Like Johnson, he must weigh how much to increase U.S. troop strength before the public and Congress turn against the war.

The similarity in the two situations is striking.

In April, 1965, U.S. forces in Vietnam totaled 26,000. Gen. William Westmoreland, the U.S. commander, asked for an additional 40,000 troops, and Presi-dent Johnson increased the level to 125,000. By Decem-ber 1965, that level had escalated to 184,000. Two years later, in December 1967, the figure had ballooned to nearly 500,000.

The current Afghanistan debate was triggered in September by Washington Post columnist George Will, whose commentary in The Daily Progress was headlined “Spare more American blood” (Sept. 3). He argued that “nation-building would be impossible even if we knew how, and even if Afghanistan were not the second worst place to try.” A few days later, New York Times columnist Nicholas Kristof weighed in with a commentary titled “The Afghanistan Abyss” (Sept. 5).

Supporters of a troop increase quickly launched a counteroffensive. The Wall Street Journal published a pro-war commentary by three senators on the Senate Armed Services Committee: Lindsey Graham, Joseph Lieberman and John McCain.

They wrote: “We are confident that not only is it winnable, but we have no choice. We must prevail in Afghanistan… . And now is the time to commit the decisive military force necessary to prevail” (“Only Decisive Force Can Prevail in Afghanistan,” Sept. 14).

Sen. Carl Levin, chairman of that committee, had a different view. He opposed sending more troops until a much greater effort is made to expand and train the Afghan army and police to fight the Taliban. Vice President Joseph Biden favors reducing our military presence in Afghanistan and concentrating instead on fighting al-Qaida in Pakistan.

Arguments heard for sending more troops to Afghanistan, and about escalating force levels in Vietnam, sound similar. In 1965, Pentagon leaders, except the Marines, favored a large troop buildup in the expectation that America could “win” the Vietnam war. After authorizing an increase, Presi-dent Johnson told the public that doing otherwise would destroy America’s credibility in Asia.

We hear similar arguments today about the impact of “surrender” in Afghanistan on U.S. relations with Asia. Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi told the Washington Post: “If the likes of Mullah Omar take over Afghanistan, it will have serious implications for Pakistan” (“Why Did Benazir Die?”, Oct. 7).

The president has three options in Afghanistan, but only two are realistic:

l Retain current force level while greatly increasing economic and military assistance programs. But this option is realistic only if sustained security can be provided in populated areas and Taliban insurgents do not expand their influence.

l Increase the force level and ensure that areas of high value — for example, the southern region around Kandahar — do not suffer a Taliban resurgence. The drawback is that sending additional troops entails more casualties, and a larger military “footprint” in populated areas may cause the population to resist “foreign occupation.”

l Withdraw the troops over two years. While this course is attractive to some, both on the left and right of the political spectrum, it is not realistic. Most Americans are not willing to “abandon” Afghanistan, as we did Vietnam. And no neighboring country — Pakistan, India or Iran — wants a political vacuum in South Asia that is filled by Taliban and al-Qaida forces. In this regard, Afghanistan differs from the situation in Vietnam.

The likely outcome of the current debate is that Barack Obama will reluctantly authorize an increase in American forces, but less than the military wants.

Additionally, he needs to instruct the Pentagon that this force level will be the limit: There should be no open-ended commitment to become more involved militarily in Af-ghanistan.

This country may never be a flourishing democracy. But helping it to become a stable, friendly country that can defend itself with U.S. assistance would be a major success for U.S. foreign policy in South Asia.